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Introduction
In 2006 the Netherlands commenced a major reform 
of its health care system. For consumers the most notable 
element was the reform of the health insurance system. 
The then existing system of social health insurance for 
people with below average income and private health 
insurance for people with above average income was 
replaced by a universal private health insurance with the 
identical entitlements and contributions for all. Tax subsi-
dies helped low income people to cover the costs of health 
insurance. A second element of the reforms was the grad-
ual introduction of elements of managed competition in 
hospital markets. More general, health insurers and health 
providers were given more freedom in contracting as the 
regulation that obliged health insurers to contract every 
registered health care provider – general practitioner, hos-
pital, physiotherapist, etc. – was abolished.
The main aims of the reforms were to improve the 
so-called “public interests” in health care. These “pub-
lic interests” were defined as quality, access, efficiency 
and cost containment in health care. At the time of the 
reforms it was widely recognized that the health care sys-
tem failed to deliver on these public interests. Access to 
health care was severely hampered by waiting lists. Be-
fore the health insurance reforms, contributions to health 
care financing were highly regressive with low income 
earners contributing a larger share of their income to 
the health care system than people with a high income. 
Dissatisfaction with the performance of the health care 
system was widespread among the population, and it was 
widely believed that the system was lagging behind in ef-
ficiency and quality of health care delivery. Productivity 
growth in health care was negligible and in some parts of 
the health care system even negative.
The aim of this paper is twofold: to describe the re-
forms that have been enacted and to evaluate the impact 
of these reforms on the “public interests” in health care.
Reform of the health insurance system
The aim of the health insurance reform was to marry 
the aspiration of “universal coverage” with the principles 
of regulated competition. The new insurance law obliged 
all residents to have basic health insurance, provided by 
14 competing private insurance companies and several 
related subsidiaries. Insurers are required to accept each 
applicant at a community-rated premium regardless of 
age or pre-existing health conditions. The basic health 
insurance covers hospital care, care by general practition-
ers and medical specialists, prescription drugs, maternity 
care, obstetrics, technical aids and dental care for chil-
dren. Insurers are obliged to accept every eligible appli-
cant, regardless of their risk profile. Once a year there is 
a six week period in which individuals have the opportu-
nity to switch health insurers.
The basic package of the Dutch health insurance 
system (“Zorgverzekeringswet”) is financed by income-
related premiums and nominal premiums. In order to 
ensure that insurance providers can continue to operate 
profitably despite carrying such a wide range of risks, the 
government has also created a “risk equalization fund”, 
to which premium payers are obliged to contribute. On 
average, 50% of total health expenditures are financed by 
income-related contributions. The income-related contri-
butions are paid into the Risk Equalization Fund, out of 
which insurers receive equalization payments to compen-
sate for high-risk enrollees. Variables that determine the 
compensation level out of the Equalization fund include, 
age, gender, postal code, and medical consumption in 
the past. The Risk Equalization Fund was established in 
order to create a level playing field among competing in-
surance companies.
About 45% of total expenditures are financed through 
the community rated insurance premiums. These premi-
ums go to the insurance company directly and are not 
redistributed through the Risk Equalization Fund. Insur-
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ance companies compete among each other on the level 
of these community rated premiums. 
The direct cost to consumers of this system are mod-
erate: the average insurance premium for an individual is 
approximately 1050 € per year. These premiums are paid 
directly to the insurer and are community rated for all 
insured with the same type of insurance policy provided 
by the insurance company. Insurers offer both “in-kind” 
insurance policies and policies based on cost refunding. 
Insurers compete to offer the basic insurance at the low-
est possible premium (and the best possible quality). 
There is a compulsory deductible of 155 € per year 
(in 2010) and the option for a maximum voluntary de-
ductible of 500 € (i.e. 655 € in total). The costs of the 
general practitioner are exempted from the deductible. 
For care that is not included in the basic package – such 
as dental care for adults, alternative medicine and most 
of the physiotherapy – there is a voluntary supplementary 
insurance with risk-related premiums.
Children below the age of 18 are exempted from pay-
ing insurance premiums. The government finances medi-
cal care for children up to the age of 18 through the risk 
equalization fund. People with low income are directly 
compensated for the costs of the nominal insurance pre-
mium. They receive an income dependent supplementary 
care benefit through the tax office to compensate them 
for the cost of the community rated premiums. This com-
pensation is paid out of general taxation.
Approximately 98% of the population has bought 
a basic health insurance. Nearly 2% of the population is 
uninsured, while a similar percentage has insurance but 
is late with its premiums. In addition to the basic package 
approximately 90% of the population buys a supplemen-
tary health insurance package as well.
The introduction of the new insurance system has 
had several notable benefits. Most obviously, it has led to 
fierce price competition and a large number of consumers 
switching health insurers. At the introduction of the new 
system approximately 20% of the insured switched to 
a different insurer. In later years this declined to an annu-
al switch rate of about 5%. Price competition was heavy 
at introduction but has declined over the years, as the 
health insurance sector has consolidated through mergers 
and takeovers. The four major health insurers now cover 
more than 80% of the market. During the first years after 
the introduction all major health insurers had losses on 
the basic health insurance. These losses are covered by 
capital the insurers accumulated in the past and by profits 
they made on the supplementary insurances. Currently 
most insurers make a small profit on the basic package 
as well.
For the in-kind insurance policies, insurers contract 
directly with health care providers. Increasingly insur-
ers engage in preferred-providers contracts, with insur-
ers providing incentives to their customers to use these 
preferred providers. From 2009, insurers can waive the 
deductible (both the compulsory and the voluntary one) if 
the customer uses one of the preferred providers.
Managed competition in hospital markets
In 2010 the Netherlands counted 98 hospitals (includ-
ing 8 academic hospitals). Aside from these general hos-
pitals there are a small but growing number of – so-called 
– independent treatment centers which provide special-
ized ambulantory care, day care and in some cases also 
provide in-patient care for selective treatments. 
All hospitals in the Netherlands are private, not-for-
profit institutions. Private equity ownership is legally 
not allowed. It is expected, however, that in the coming 
years experiments with (partially) for profit hospitals 
will be conducted. Legal ownership of almost all hos-
pitals and independent treatment centers is by a not-for-
-profit foundation. Hospital management lies with an 
executive board of two to five people, depending on the 
size of the hospital. A board of trustees of the founda-
tion provides oversight and governance to the executive 
board. All medical specialists at academic hospitals are 
in paid employment of the hospital. At general hospitals 
most medical specialist are not in paid employment with 
the hospital. In the general hospitals specialists are usu-
ally partners in a cooperation of medical specialists. The 
cooperation of medical specialists is a independent legal 
entity. Each individual specialist enters into a contractual 
relation with the hospital in order to be allowed to prac-
tice in the hospital.
A crucial element in the introduction of regulated 
competition in hospital markets was the introduction of 
Diagnosis Treatment Combinations (DBC). A DBC is 
a 7 figure classification code that a patient receives after 
a first contact with a medical specialist in the hospital 
(mostly at the first visit of the policlinic). The DBC code 
specifies the diagnosis and the normative treatment in 
terms of consultations, diagnostic tests, treatment and 
normative time spent on the patient by medical spe-
cialists. It somewhat resembles the Diagnostic Related 
Groups (DRG) that are used in hospital financing else-
where, but by construction and content the DBC’s are 
different from any DRG system.
Since 2008 hospital reimbursement is based on the 
number of DBC’s produced. The DBC price or tariff in-
cludes the full costs of treatment, including hospital stay, 
materials, costs of physicians and staff, and compensation 
for equipment and building costs. Consequently, hospi-
tals have to cover all costs from the production of DBC’s, 
whereas previously hospital received separate budgets for 
hospital beds, building and renovation, purchase of equip-
ment, and treatment of patients. This change to a full cost 
reimbursement based on production of care has substan-
tially increased the financial risks for hospitals. As a result 
some hospitals have started to make financial losses and 
a few of them have become insolvent.
The DBC’s also determine the compensation for 
medical specialists. Each DBC includes a normative time 
for medical specialist care. For each hour allocated in the 
DBC the medical specialist receives 132.50 €. This in-
cludes costs for overhead for the medical specialist. Total 
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revenue for the medical specialist is determined by the 
total number of DBC’s produced, the normative time per 
DBC times 132.50 €.
For about a third of all hospital interventions DBC 
prices are freely negotiable. The DBC’s for which prices 
are negotiable mainly include elective surgery. Hospitals 
compete on price and quality of care in contracting insur-
ers for these procedures. Insurers use these cost and qual-
ity differences to steer patients to preferred providers. By 
contracting more with hospitals that offer lower prices 
and better quality, insurers reduce waiting times at these 
hospitals. Shorter waiting times are used by insurers to 
steer patients to these hospitals.
Governance in health care
There is an extensive system of external governance. 
This external governance complements the internal gov-
ernance by the board of trustees or the non-governing 
board of the health care organization. The Dutch Health 
Authority (Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, Nza) monitors 
the health insurance market and the health care delivery 
markets. It is the task of the Health Authority to guard the 
public interests and to ensure access, freedom of choice 
and managed or regulated competition in the system. 
The Health Authority also has the responsibility to set 
prices or tariffs in health care markets where prices are 
not freely negotiable. Quality of care is monitored and 
safeguarded by the Health Care Inspectorate (Inspectie 
voor de Gezondheidszorg, IGZ). Major mergers between 
health care organizations are subject to approval of the 
Netherlands Competition Authority (Nederlandse Med-
edingingsautoriteit, NMa). The Competition Authority 
can also intervene and impose sanctions when two or 
more health care organizations are colluding to increase 
prices or try into divide the market between themselves.
A quasi-governmental institution, the College of 
Health Insurance (College voor Zorgverzekeringen, 
CVZ) advises the minister of health about the content of 
the insured package and the inclusion of innovative treat-
ments for reimbursement in the basic health insurance 
package. The minister of health almost always adheres to 
the advice of the College in his decision about the insur-
ance package.
The income-related premiums that are collected by 
the tax administration and are put in the Risk Equaliza-
tion Fund, are subsequently allocated by the College of 
Health Insurance (CVZ) to the separate health insur-
ers. CVZ uses a risk adjustment formula to compute the 
prospective budgets of the health insurers. 
The effects of the reforms on the “public interests”
What have been the effects of the gradual reforms in 
the health insurance and health care purchase markets on 
the ‘public interests’ defined by the Dutch government?
Quality
In 2009 and 2010 the Netherlands ranked first on the 
Euro Health Consumer Index which measures quality of 
health care systems in Europe (see www.healthpower-
house.com/archives/cat_media_room.html). This first 
place is generally perceived as a result of the health care 
reforms.
In 2008 a number of health insurance companies start-
ed to work together with local, regional or national pa-
tients groups to develop patient-centered criteria for con-
tracting care-providers. Insurers have become more and 
more interested in the preferences of patients for the sake 
of purchasing. After all, it makes good business sense.
This coalition of insurance providers and patients 
seems to be quite effective. It has provided a counter-
balance to the strong health care providers, traditionally 
the most powerful player in this market. It improves the 
position of the patient and it entitles the insurer as the 
formal representative on the demand side. Moreover it 
provides a strong incentive for the insurer to concentrate 
on patient-oriented care and on quality, instead of focus-
ing on the price of their policies.
Insurers also use selective contracting to steer pa-
tients. Selective contracting enables insurers to offer 
quicker access to care in one hospital while at the same 
time lengthening waiting times at others. Insurers use the 
length of waiting time to steer patients to better quality 
hospitals. Recently, one of the largest health insurers pub-
lished a list with quality ratings of breast cancer treat-
ment of all Dutch hospitals and announced that it will no 
longer contract the worst performing hospitals for breast 
cancer treatment. Other health insurers have announced 
they will also use explicit quality indicators for selective 
contracting. For this, some insurers use negative lists of 
hospitals they do not want to contract, others use posi-
tive lists of preferred (or star-rated) providers. Aside from 
selective contracting, insurers are able to guide patients 
to their preferred providers by providing counseling and 
information to their insured where to find treatment.
The Dutch government has tried to bring greater 
transparency to the performance of health care provid-
ers. Within a few years, providers will be obliged to 
quantify the quality of the care they provide, in a way 
that will enable patients themselves to make an informed 
choice about the different options. Patients will be able to 
‘vote with their feet’ to determine which insurance com-
panies offer the best value. 
Access
Waiting lists for hospital treatment and medical 
specialist have either disappeared or have been greatly 
reduced over the past ten years. This is partly due to ef-
ficiency improvement and productivity growth (better 
planning and improved logistic processes). The main 
reason for the reduction in waiting lists is the increase in 
health care spending which has led to more treatment of 
patients by physicians.
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In the health insurance market the regressive system 
that was in place before the reforms has been replaced 
by a system with the same basic package of entitlements 
for all citizens (previously people with private insurance 
could choose what to insure and what not) and a fairer 
distribution of contributions because of the tax subsidies 
for low income people (previously young high income 
earners with private insurance paid far less in health in-
surance premiums than low income earners who were in 
the compulsory social insurance system).
Efficiency
One of the most remarkable achievement of the lib-
eralization of hospital prices has been an increase in pro-
ductivity growth. During the period 2000–2008 average 
annual labor productivity growth in hospitals was 0.8% 
[1]. This is double the labor productivity growth in the 
entire health care sector (0.4%). Productivity growth also 
has increased after prices for hospital treatment (DBC 
prices) were partially liberated.
Cost containment
The risk equalization system provides some incen-
tives to insurers for cost control. For insurers the greatest 
financial risks are on the costs for general practitioners 
and pharmaceuticals. For hospital costs there is a risk 
sharing mechanism or a mutual insurance by which high 
hospital costs are partly shared between insurers. Also in-
surance companies are compensated if the macro budget 
for health care – on which the premium levels are based 
– is exceeded. These ex post compensation mechanisms 
considerably reduce the financial risks for insurers and 
consequently the incentives for insurers to force hospitals 
to reduce costs and increase efficiency.
The prospective budget that health insurers receive 
from the Risk Equalization Fund for hospital care is 
supplemented by this generous ex-post compensation 
system. Consequently, health insurers are only partly 
financial responsible for hospital costs. For them ad-
ditional hospital costs are partly a free lunch compared 
to pharmaceutical cost and other outpatient costs. This 
“perverse” incentive discourages substitution of inpatient 
care by outpatient or pharmacotherapeutic care. Health 
insurers have little incentives for cost containment in the 
hospital sector in favor of outpatient care and innovative 
pharmaceutical care even when the utilization of innova-
tive drugs is more cost effective. 
Health insurers do bear the full financial risks for all 
non-hospital costs (including all outpatient pharmaceuti-
cal costs). If the prospective budget for the non-hospital 
costs for some or all health insurers turns out to be insuf-
ficient afterwards, the financial risk has to be borne by 
the health insurers. This is a strong incentive for health 
insurers to contain non-hospital costs, such as pharma-
ceutical costs. 
In short, the main drawbacks of unequal risk regimes 
of hospital care and non-hospital care in the risk adjust-
ment system are: 
• It is not in line with the politically and socially desi-
red shift towards outpatient health care. 
• It lowers the efficiency of the Dutch health care sy-
stem.
• It hampers the realization of welfare gains attributed 
to the utilization of innovative drugs.
• It may reduce the potential gains in quality of life of 
patients as they do not receive the best available tre-
atment.
The performance of the health insurers in cost con-
tainment is poor. The annual real growth rate of health 
care costs is 4–6%. Insurers have been most active in 
reducing costs of generic pharmaceuticals. Most insurers 
have introduced a so-called preference policy for gener-
ics, under which only the cheapest drug within a class 
of identical generic drugs is reimbursed. This policy has 
reduced spending on pharmaceuticals by approximately 
500 € million per year or 5–10% of the total costs.
The poor performance in cost containment of the 
Dutch health care system is illustrated by the figures 
Real growth % p.y. 
(2000–2006) Expenditures as % BNP
Expenditures on curative 
care per capita ($) PPP
Expenditures ($) PPP per 
consult
Netherlands 4.2 9.3 1887 394
Denmark 4.1 9.5 1851 268
Austria 2.0 10.1 2151 321
Belgium 2.6 10.4 1679 224
Germany 1.4 10.6 1750 240
France 3.1 11.1 1808 274
Italy 2.9 9.0 1760 251
Spain 4.1 8.4 1361 175
UK 5.1 8.4 Nb. Nb.
Average 3.4 9.6 1781 268
Table I. Expenditures and expenditure growth in health care, selected countries.
Source: RVZ 2008.
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in Table I. Both the expenditure growth in the Nether-
lands and the costs per consult were higher than in most 
other countries. Furthermore, studies by Kroneman et al. 
(2009) [2] and OECD (2009) [3] show that the income of 
general practitioners and medical specialists in the Neth-
erlands are among the highest in the world.
Conclusion
The role of the government in the new system is to 
ensure the “public interests” in health care and to encour-
age competition and create countervailing power on the 
care contracting, the health insurance and the care provi-
sion markets. In a system of regulated competition the 
role of the government is to ensure “public interests”: 
quality of health care provision, access, efficiency and 
cost containment. This is primarily done through the gov-
ernance institutions (Nza, NMA, IGZ). On most of these 
public interests the health care reforms which started in 
2005 (but which are not yet fully implemented) have had 
positive effects. 
However, still much needs to be done. Transparen-
cy and choice in healthcare depend on the existence of 
solid, preferably legally-based, quality standards. These 
standards are not yet in place in the Netherlands, but the 
government is working towards their development. It is 
likely that an independent executive council will be cre-
ated to set these standards. 
The reforms have failed to curb the rapid rising costs 
of health care. This will most likely prove to be one of the 
most challenging tasks for the years ahead. Eliminating 
the risk compensation mechanisms for the health insur-
ers is one of the most important tools to provide insurers 
with more incentives to control costs.
By now, there is overwhelming evidence for a posi-
tive relation between quality and efficiency in health care 
(see, for example, Ludwig et. al. 2010 for evidence on 
hospitals in the Netherlands [4]). It is this connection that 
will eventually force health insurance companies to make 
purchasing decisions based on quality instead of exclu-
sively on prices. Having said that, the reforms are still 
a work in progress, and there is still a great deal of room 
for further efficiency gains from health care providers in 
the Dutch health care system.
Abstract:
In 2006 the Netherlands commenced a major reform of its health care 
system. The main elements of the reform were: 1) replacement of the 
existing system of social health insurance for people with below aver-
age income and private health insurance for people with above average 
income by a universal private health insurance with the identical entitle-
ments and contributions for all 2) the gradual introduction of elements 
of managed competition in hospital markets. The main aims of the re-
forms were to improve the so-called “public interests” in health care 
which were defined as quality, access, efficiency and cost containment 
in health care.
This paper describes the reforms that have been enacted in the Dutch 
health care system and evaluates the impact of these reforms on the 
“public interests” in health care.
The health care reforms have had positive effects on most of “public in-
terests”, though still much needs to be done e.g. development of quality 
standards, curbing the rapid rising costs of health care. Nevertheless, 
the reforms are still a work in progress, and there is still a great deal of 
room for further improvement in ‘public interest’ in the Dutch health 
care system.
Streszczenie:
Poprawa jakości i efektywności oraz ograniczenie kosztów 
poprzez regulowaną konkurencję w holenderskim systemie 
opieki zdrowotnej
Słowa kluczowe: reforma systemu opieki zdrowotnej, Holandia, 
jakość, efektywność, ograniczenie kosztów
W roku 2006 rozpoczęła się reforma systemu opieki zdrowotnej w Ho-
landii. Główne elementy tej reformy to: 1) wprowadzenie uniwersal-
nego systemu prywatnych ubezpieczeń zdrowotnych z jednolitymi dla 
wszystkich uprawnieniami i składką, obejmując nim także istniejący 
system społecznych ubezpieczeń zdrowotnych dla osób wykazujących 
się dochodami niższymi od dochodu przeciętnego oraz prywatnych 
ubezpieczeń zdrowotnych dla osób z dochodami wyższymi od dochodu 
przeciętnego, 2) stopniowe wprowadzenie elementów zarządzania kon-
kurencją na rynku szpitalnym. Głównymi celami tych reform było polep-
szenie tzw. interesu publicznego (public interest) w opiece zdrowotnej, 
na którego definicję złożyły się jakość, dostępność, efektywność oraz 
ograniczenie kosztów. 
W artykule opisuje się reformy, które zostały wprowadzone w holender-
skim systemie opieki zdrowotnej z punktu oceny ich wpływu na public 
interests w opiece zdrowotnej. 
Reformy opieki zdrowotnej przyniosły pozytywny skutek w odniesieniu 
do większości komponentów interesu publicznego, chociaż nadal wie-
le pozostaje do zrobienia, np. poprawa standardów jakości czy ograni-
czenie gwałtownie rosnących kosztów opieki zdrowotnej. Niemniej jed-
nak realizacja reform nie została jeszcze zakończona i nadal istnieje 
wiele możliwości uzyskania dalszej poprawy w zakresie public interests 
w holenderskim systemie opieki zdrowotnej. 
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